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Technological Neutrality Explained & Applied
to CBC v. SODRAC
Cameron J. Hutchison*
The term ‘‘technological neutrality” surfaced in the Supreme Court’s 2012
copyright jurisprudence though no one, including the Federal Court of Appeal in
CBC v. SODRAC,1 quite knows exactly what it means. This article analyzes the
principle of technological neutrality as comprising two dimensions: as non-
discrimination in that new technologies endogenous to copyright are to be
embraced under the Act2 to the benefit of both copyright holders and users; and
as non-interference insofar as sufficiently high thresholds of conduct or activity
are required before copyright liability will attach to technologies endogenous to
copyright. It may surprise some that both iterations of this principle (though not
so named) are well established in Supreme Court copyright jurisprudence. Once
these dimensions are understood, we must then struggle with the issue of its
application as a ‘‘principle” of copyright law. I argue that principles of law assist
interpretation by providing direction in the face of ambiguous or absurd
statutory meaning in unusual cases. In other words, principles rationalize the law
in a way that strict construction of statutory meaning cannot always accomplish.
Principles do not compel specific results, but rather are a tool that might augur
for a particular interpretation of statutory meaning in a given factual context in
order to make the law coherent.
This article explores technological neutrality in the factual context of CBC v.
SODRAC, heard before the Supreme Court of Canada in March of 2015 with
decision pending at the time of publication. After outlining the history of the case
in the first part, this article concludes with an application of the principle of
technological neutrality, as non-interference, to the case. The only result coherent
with the Supreme Court’s prior case law is to not treat non-usable or dormant
incidental copies as reproductions under the Act. The status of permanent copies
that serve a useful and identifiable purpose, e.g. archived copies, is less clear
though it would not necessarily create incoherence in the law to recognize them
as reproductions.
* Faculty of Law, University of Alberta.
1 Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. SODRAC 2003 Inc., 2014 FCA 84, 2014 CarswellNat
808, 2014 CarswellNat 809 (F.C.A.), leave to appeal allowed 2014 CarswellNat 3299,
2014 CarswellNat 3300 (S.C.C.) Per Pelletier J. at paras 39-40: ‘‘A careful reading of
these passages [from the Supreme Court 2012 decisions] incorporate at least three views
of technological neutrality. . .In light of these different views of technological neutrality,
it is difficult to know how one is to approach technological neutrality post-ESA.”
2 Copyright Act, RSC 1985, c-42 [hereinafter Act].
I. THE DISPUTE
This is the Supreme Court’s sixth case in the past dozen years dealing with
the copyright implications of internet and digitization technology. This time the
purported copying at issue is situated within the context of splicing musical
works into visual works, a process known as synchronization. While TV and
radio have long required the making of copies to effect a broadcast, advances in
digital technology now demand more copies than ever to achieve efficient
delivery of broadcasted content.3 In the television context, or audiovisual
medium, several copies of a musical work, perhaps as many as 12 and 20, are
needed to produce, edit, and mix prior to delivery to the broadcaster.4 Once
received by the broadcaster, several more copies of the digital file are made
before, during, and after the program is broadcast to ensure compatibility with
existing software, to undertake further editing for purposes of language or closed
captioning, and/or to make back-up and delivery copies.5 The Copyright Board
identified the types of copies made as follows:
11. . ..Synchronization refers to the process of incorporating a musical
work into an audiovisual work.7 Thus, a synchronization copy is any
copy made in order to include the work into the final (master) copy of
an audiovisual work. A post-synchronization copy of the music is made
each time the audiovisual work itself is copied, for example to
broadcast, deliver or distribute the audiovisual work.
12. An incidental copy is necessary or helpful to achieve an intended
outcome but is not part of the outcome itself. A production-incidental
copy is made in the process of producing and distributing an
audiovisual work, either before or after the master copy is made: it is
a form of synchronization copy. A broadcast-incidental copy is made to
facilitate the broadcast of an audiovisual work or to preserve the work
in the broadcaster’s archives, while a distribution-incidental copy is
made for purposes of readying or preserving the motion picture for
3 SeeCommercial RadioCopyright Board of Canada (9 July 2010) at paras 56—71: In the
radio context, the Copyright Board has detailed the process of broadcasting newmusic.
If a station is interested in obtaining a song that has been uploaded onto DMDS by a
record label, it downloads a temporary encrypted copy of the music file onto its server;
that temporary copy is then decrypted and decompressed into a usable copy; in most
instances, this copy is then placed on a ‘‘download directory” of the broadcaster’s hard
drive; from here, an editor may download a copy to alter and manipulate the metadata
(but not the music content) associated with the file, e.g. the genre of music; once the
editing is complete, multiple copies may then be placed back onto the hard drive where it
may be accessed by a number employees to facilitate evaluation and selection of the
music. Furthermore, to safeguard against server or network failure, an additional local
copy may be made. In Copyright Act, ss 70.2 and 70.15 Copyright Board of Canada (2
November 2012) [hereinafter CBD], the Board implies at para 51 that the technical
aspects of music broadcasting serve as a good background to understanding the
broadcasting of synchronized works.
4 CBD, supra note 3 at para 52.
5 Ibid at para 54.
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distribution to the public: both are forms of post-synchronization
copies.6
Importantly, the Board notes that ‘‘[w]hile it is still possible to deliver
television broadcasts without the use of servers and digital reproduction
technologies, the efficiencies and added functionality associated with these
technologies are such that such use has become the norm, not the exception.”7
(a) The Copyright Board Decision
The Federal Court of Appeal decision, discussed below, arose from three
applications for judicial review of Copyright Board decisions.8 The main parties
to the Copyright Board, Federal Court, and Supreme Court of Canada appeal
proceedings are the CBC and SODRAC. The Canadian Broadcasting
Corporation (CBC) is Canada’s national public broadcaster and is engaged in
both the production and broadcasting of radio and television programs. The
Society for Reproduction Rights of Authors, Composers and Publishers in
Canada Inc. and SODRAC 2003 Inc. (collectively SODRAC) are collective
societies that administer the reproduction rights of musical compositions. As
both a producer and broadcaster of audiovisual content, the CBC requires a
synchronization license from SODRAC to mesh musical works from SODRAC’s
catalogue into audiovisual content. The nature of the dispute between these two
parties was whether a synchronization license exhausts the reproduction rights
associated with the musical work; or put another way, whether incidental copies
made in the production and broadcast of the synchronized work engage the
reproduction right on top of the performance right already purchased.
SODRAC’s main argument was that its ‘‘bare” synchronization license
permits a limited number of copies to be made and that ‘‘these licenses do not
authorize downstream copies”, in particular broadcast-incidental copies.9 In
other words, broadcasters must pay (and pay handsomely) for these incidental
copies. The CBC responded that ‘‘through-to-the-viewer” licenses, in which all
copies needed to effect a broadcast to the intended consumer market, not only
facilitates a functioning market but should form the basis for interpreting the
reproduction right in the synchronization context.10 Moreover, the CBC argued
that the increased number of copies demanded by new technology should not be
reflected to both the benefit of SODRAC and detriment of technology users. If
6 Ibid at paras 11-12.
7 Ibid at para 53.
8 CBC v. SODRAC, supra note 1 at para 5.
9 CBD, supra note 3 at para 22. See also para 73: ‘‘Virtually all of SODRAC licenses issued
to producers that were filed in these proceedings clearly specify, in one form or another,
that the producer cannot authorize copies made by broadcasters, distributors and other
exhibitors.”
10 Ibid at para 27.
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this is to be the case, then there will be a disincentive for broadcasters to adopt
new technologies.11
The Copyright Board of Canada held that broadcast incidental copies were
reproductions under the Act subject to compensation. Moreover there were
sound policy reasons in their view for doing so:
The adoption of copy-dependent technologies allows broadcasters to
remain competitive and to protect their core business even when it does
not generate direct profits. These technologies are necessary for Astral
and CBC to remain relevant so that services continue to be seen by the
public. These are clear benefits arising from copy-dependant technol-
ogies. Since these technologies involve the use of additional copies,
some of the benefits associated with the technologies must be reflected
in the remuneration that flows from these incidental additional
copies.12
This view that copyright holders should be paid for the benefits accruing
through the use of new technologies stands in stark contrast to the Supreme
Court’s dicta on the issue in similar cases.13
(b) The Federal Court of Appeal
On appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal, the CBC challenged both of these
findings, namely that incidental copies made for broadcast implicate the
reproduction right, and that such copies added any value to the broadcasting
enterprise.14 On the legal issue of the reproduction right, the CBC argued that
assessing royalties on necessary incidental copies for digital production
discourages the use and development of new technologies.15 The CBC relied
on the Supreme Court’s copyright pentology, and in particular Entertainment
Software, Rogers, and the Bell cases, in advancing its technological neutrality
argument. However, the Federal Court had problems deciphering a precise
meaning of technological neutrality;16 as such, it relied on a much clearer
precedent in the pre-digital Supreme Court of Canada case, Bishop v. Stevens.
In Bishop, a sound recording copy was made of a song writer’s composition
as performed by another artist for the purpose of a broadcast. The song writer
claimed that the pre-recorded tape of the performance implicated his
11 Ibid at para 30.
12 Ibid at para 81.
13 See, for example,SOCANv.CAIP, infra note 57 and accompanying text, wherein cached
copies, needed to facilitate an economical and efficient internet, were foundnot to attract
copyright liability since it does not touch on the legitimate interests of the copyright
holder.
14 CBC v. SODRAC, supra note 1 at paras 28 and 29. The FCA refused to reconsider the
second finding as this was one of fact.
15 Ibid at para 30.
16 See the three possible meanings suggested at ibid at para 39.
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reproduction right for which no license was given. The defendant broadcaster did
not deny that such a copy was made but instead suggested that the copy was
‘‘ephemeral” and made solely for the purpose of the broadcast; as such it should
not attract copyright liability.17 Interestingly, the Supreme Court observed ‘‘[t]he
issue in this case arises because the introduction of new technology presented a
situation not contemplated by the drafters of the original Canadian Copyright
Act in the 1920’s.”18 But, much like the Copyright Board in the present decision,
the court emphasized that copyright law is ‘‘purely statutory law” and adhered to
the section 3 delineation between the right to make a sound recording of a work,
in section 3(1)(d), as distinct from the right to perform the work in the chapeau
of section 3.19 In other words, the ‘‘ephemeral copy” triggered the reproduction
right of the copyright holder.
In the present case, Bishop was cited by the Federal Court of Appeal as
binding precedent that was directly on point, in that ‘‘ephemeral recordings made
solely for the purpose of facilitating a broadcast of a work were caught by
paragraph 3(1)(d) of the Act and were not implied in the right to broadcast a
work.”20 The CBC appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of Canada, for
which leave was granted.
17 Ibid at para 5. At para 14, the appellant argued that: ‘‘An ephemeral recording may be
distinguished from a true recording by the purpose for which it is made. A record within
themeaning of s. 3(1)(d), according to the appellant, is onemade for the purpose of being
reproduced, thereby reaching a wider audience than the original performance. An
ephemeral recording, on the other hand, is but a means to facilitate reaching exactly the
same audience as a live broadcast performance would. It is not intended to be
reproduced, and it is often technically unsuitable for high quality reproduction.”
Another argument of the appellant presaged technological neutrality as non-interference
in that ephemeral copies were said to be practically necessary to facilitate modern
broadcasting: ibid at para 23.
18 Ibid at para 9.
19 In a rather unexpected turn, the court then buttresses this holding by emphasizing the
importance of preserving the sound recording right in this context: ‘‘A recording. . .is
permanent. It may be copied easily, privately and precisely. Once a work has been
recorded, the recording takes on a life of its own. That is why, froma composer’s point of
view, the right to control the circumstances under which the first recording is made is
crucial. Once the composer hasmade or authorized a recording of his work, he has given
up much control over its presentation to the public. These are reasons why the rights to
perform and to record are recognized as distinct in the Act, and why in practice a
composer may wish to authorize performance but not recordings of his work.” Ibid at
para 21.
20 Ibid at para 52. It should be noted that the 3(1)(d) wording has changed but not in a
material way. It now reads [used to read] : ‘‘in the case of a literary, dramatic or musical
work, tomake any sound recording [sound recording replaces ‘‘record, perforated roll”],
cinematograph film or other contrivance by means of which the work may be
mechanically reproduced or performed.”
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II. THE PRINCIPLE OF TECHNOLOGICAL NEUTRALITY
It is understandable that the Federal Court of Appeal was confounded by the
principle of technological neutrality. The phrase has been used in different ways
by prior courts in cases involving internet or digital facts. The concept has also
been applied in many of these same cases without being identified as such. In this
section, I offer an analytical framework for understanding both technological
neutrality, and the role of principles in legal interpretation. I undertake the latter
task first.
(a) The Role of Principles in Legal Interpretation
Judicially created principles, arising as they might without statutory
pedigree, should be understood not as activism but as a necessary tool for
bringing coherence to the law. This is no less true for statutory law, where often
general rules are set out in advance by a Legislature far removed from the point
of application in specific cases. Indeed, statutes like the Copyright Act attempt to
prospectively regulate complex areas of human activity with a view to
paradigmatically conceived scenarios, i.e. typical kinds of foreseeable cases that
might arise.21 These statutory provisions, including all of the ones discussed in
this article, are typically broadly worded and non-specific to any particular
result. It follows that statutory meaning will often be uncertain or incomplete in
the face of novel cases, the kinds of cases not foreseen by the legislature and for
which, consequently, there is no reasonably clear interpretation flowing from the
statute. These problems place judges in the difficult role of developing the
meaning of the law at the point of application in respect of novel disputes.
One way that courts can facilitate the coherent development of the law is
through the application of principles to resolve uncertain or absurd statutory
meaning in the face of novel facts. Ronald Dworkin explained the role of
principles, as contrasted with rules. To him, rules dictate ‘‘in an all or nothing
fashion. If the facts a rule stipulates are given, then either the rule is valid. . .or it
is not. . .”22 Principles do not operate in an all or nothing fashion nor do they
explicate the conditions of their application; rather, they offer a reason to argue
in one direction but without necessitating a particular decision. Furthermore, in
situations where the literal application of a rule may lead to an otherwise
straightforward though unreasonable result, Dworkin insists on a mediating role
for legal principle:
Instead, we make a case for a principle, and for its weight, by appealing
to an amalgam of practice and other principles in which the
implications of legislative and judicial history figure along with appeals
21 See HLAHart, The Concept of Law 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) at 128. See
also Cameron Hutchison, ‘‘Which Kraft of Statutory Interpretation: A Supreme Court
of Canada Trilogy on Intellectual Property Law” (2008) 46 Alberta L R 1, at pp 21 ff.
22 RonaldDworkin,TakingRights Seriously (Cambridge:HarvardUniversity Press, 1977)
at 24.
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to community practices and understandings. There is no litmus paper
for testing the soundness of such a case—it is a matter of judgment, and
reasonable men may disagree.23
As an example, Dworkin presents the case of Riggs v. Palmer, in which a
court was faced with a grandson seeking to inherit from a validly enacted will
made by the grandfather whom he murdered. Since this was a validly enacted will
according to statute (and further there was no mention that a beneficiary could
not inherit as a result of murdering a testator in that statute), a straightforward
application of the rule should have permitted the grandson to inherit. Yet, the
court found that it is a fundamental maxim of the common law, as found in
contract and property law, that no one should profit from his own wrongdoing;
as such the grandson was denied the inheritance.24
In the context of the CBC v. SODRAC dispute, the rule that a copy is a copy
and implicates the reproduction right (rule) may in some instances need to give
way to technological neutrality (principle). This is not merely a theoretical
proposition. The Supreme Court has used principles, in a Dworkinian sense, to
resolve a number of copyright disputes in the face of unclear or absurd statutory
meaning.
(b) Principles of Copyright Law
Other than technological neutrality, there are at least two other ‘‘tentative”
principles (so named because they are disputed) of intellectual property law that
have emerged in Supreme Court jurisprudence in recent years. They are the
principle of legitimate economic interests which first appears in Theberge,25 and
the separation principle which debuts in Kirkbi.26
In Theberge, the central issue was whether an ink transfer of a print from one
substrate (paper) to another (canvas), without creating more copies in the
process, engaged the copyright holder’s right to ‘‘produce or reproduce” the
work under section 3 of the Act. This language is broad and non-specific to a
particular result in this factual context. Binnie J., for the majority, reasoned that
23 Ibid at 36.
24 Ibid at 23. But howdoweknowwhen, as inRiggs v. Palmer, a rule should be changed by a
principle? Dworkin’s answer in Law’s Empire, when he revisits this question, is: ‘‘[i]t is
only because we think the case for excludingmurderers from a general statute of wills is a
strong one, sanctioned by principles elsewhere respected in the law, that we find the
statute unclear on the issue.” Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge Mass:
Harvard University Press, 1986) at 352.
25 Galerie d’art du Petit Champlain inc. c. Théberge, 2002 SCC 34, 2002 CarswellQue 306,
2002 CarswellQue 307 (S.C.C.). My brief treatment of the cases in this section in
particular reflects an assumption that most readers of this article are familiar with these
judgments.
26 Kirkbi AG v. Ritvik Holdings Inc. / Gestions Ritvik Inc., 2005 SCC 65, 2005 CarswellNat
3631, 2005 CarswellNat 3632 (S.C.C.).
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But in what way has the legitimate economic interest of the copyright
holder been infringed? The process began with a single poster and
ended with a single poster. The image ‘‘fixed” in ink is the subject-
matter of the intellectual property and it was not reproduced. It was
transferred from one display to another.27
The tentative principle of legitimate economic interests offered a reason to
limit the copyright holder’s reproduction right in favor of the purchaser’s interest
to engage in this activity with validly purchased copies.
In Kirkbi, the makers of Lego blocks attempted to extend their monopoly
after the patent expired by claiming the design of the blocks as unregistered
trade-marks. The doctrine of functionality, which disallows such utilitarian
features to be used as a trade-mark, prevented them from doing so. The only
problem was that Kirkbi had a strong statutory interpretation argument that
negated the doctrine of functionality in respect of unregistered marks.28 That
result, however, would have been absurd in that unregistered marks would be
treated very differently in this respect than registered marks. Rather than
struggle with the sloppy legislative drafting that led to such a result, the court
instead began its analysis with what seemed to be an organizing principle of
intellectual property regimes:
The economic value of intellectual property rights arouses the
imagination and litigiousness of rights holders in their search for
continuing protection of what they view as their rightful property. Such
a search carries with it the risk of discarding basic and necessary
distinctions between different forms of intellectual property and their legal
and economic functions. The present appeal is a case in point. It involves
the distinction between patents and trade-marks. In order to under-
stand the role and relevance of the doctrine of functionality in the law
of trade-marks, some comments on the nature and function of patents
and trade-marks will be useful.29 (emphasis added)
This separation principle in Kirkbi essentially overrides an otherwise
straightforward albeit absurd application of the statute. The doctrine of
functionality therefore applied to both registered and unregistered trade-marks.
In Bastarache J.’s judgement in Euro Excellence,30 both ‘‘legitimate
economic interests” and ‘‘separation” were applied as principles (though not
called as such) in a way that avoided an unpalatable result suggested by the
legislation. The facts and law in the case are complicated and, for present
purposes, it is enough to know that the copyright in trade-marked logos was
asserted as a means of preventing the otherwise legal importation of chocolate
27 Theberge, supra note 25 at para 38.
28 See Hutchison, supra note 21 at p 13 — 15.
29 Ibid at para 37.
30 Kraft Canada Inc. v. Euro Excellence Inc., 2007 SCC 37, 2007 CarswellNat 2087, 2007
CarswellNat 2088 (S.C.C.).
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bars. In holding that copyright should not be misused to frustrate legitimate
trade, Bastarache J. reasoned that both the legitimate economic interests31 of the
copyright holder, as referred to in Theberge, and the separation of intellectual
property regimes,32 as articulated in Kirkbi, meant that ‘‘incidental” works of
copyright, in this case logos on chocolate bars that functioned as trade-marks,
are not actionable in this context. Importantly, the two other judgements in that
case either rejected the application of these concepts as having any bearing on the
dispute, or did not consider them. Nonetheless, Bastarache’s judgement very
much applied these principles in a Dworkinian sense.
It is not unusual that the meaning of a principle—indeed its very
existence—may be judicially debated. Reasonable men may, as Dworkin tells
us, disagree about such things. Decision makers must look to the judicial and
legislative history, together with community understandings and practices, to
ascertain whether a concept has achieved enough traction within the legal corpus
that it has persuasive value as a fundamental organizing principle of the law.
Legitimate economic interests and separation appear not to have attained that
level. However, the principle of technological neutrality, as the next section
shows, has permeated the case law such that it may be used, where relevant, to
make the law a coherent whole.
(c) Technological Neutrality Explained
The principle of technological neutrality has played a central role in the
interpretation of key issues in copyright law jurisprudence over the past dozen
years. Almost inadvertently, the case law has developed the principle more than
has heretofore been recognized. It is now possible to define the contours of
technological neutrality in a way that can be meaningfully applied to cases like
CBC v. SODRAC.
The principle of technological neutrality embraces two different concepts: (1)
a principle of non-discrimination in respect of technologies and activities
endogenous to copyright; and (2) a principle of non-interference in connection
with activities and technologies exogenous to the Act. The primary purpose and
effect of non-discrimination is to ensure that copyright doctrine evolves in ways
31 Ibid at para 85. The Act protects only the legitimate economic interests of copyright
holders. It protects the economic benefits of skill and judgment; it does not protect all
economic benefits of all types of labour... In particular, if a work of skill and judgment
(such as a logo) is attached to some other consumer good (such as a chocolate bar), the
economic gains associated with the sale of the consumer good must not be mistakenly
viewed as the legitimate economic interests of the copyright holder of the logo that are
protected by the law of copyright.
32 Ibid at para 87: ”. . . While it is certainly true that one work can be the subject of both
copyright and trade-mark protection (see s. 64(3)(b) of the Act), it is equally certain that
different forms of intellectual property protect different types of economic interests. To
ignore this factwouldbe to ignore the ‘‘basic andnecessary distinctions betweendifferent
forms of intellectual property and their legal and economic functions”, as noted byLeBel
J. at para 37 of Kirkbi.”
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that embraces new technologies. This can operate to extend the rights of both
owners and users of copyright. The main concern of non-interference is that
copyright not unduly restrict the use of existing, or the innovation and
development of new, technologies. A corollary of both non-discrimination and
non-interference is the concept of functional equivalency, in that it furthers the
goals of both iterations of technological neutrality to treat new technologies the
same as functionally equivalent existing technologies.
(i) Non-Discrimination
Courts have long taken the view that a copyright subsists not only in the
medium in which the work is created but all existing and future media in which
the work might be expressed. In other words, we might say that copyright does
not discriminate against any technology—even those yet to come into being—so
long as enough of the expression survives its transfer into the new medium. The
statutory basis often cited for this principle (formerly known as media neutrality)
is the section 3 right of copyright holders ‘‘. . .to produce or reproduce the work
or any substantial part thereof in any material form whatever. . .”
The italicized language was in issue in Robertson v. Thomson Corp.33 In that
case, the legal question was whether the newspaper’s collective work copyright,
or a journalist’s individual article copyright, was reproduced by the process of
digitizing archived newspapers that contained both. The court reasoned that if
enough of the skill and judgment of the collective work format is perceptible to
the viewer of an archived work, then the newspaper copyright prevails. By the
same token, if the end user is allowed to retrieve articles individually and out of
context of the collective work, then it is the journalist’s copyright that is
reproduced. The court therefore provided a method of adapting the right to
reproduce a work to digital technologies in this context. Also, the first indication
that media neutrality might apply beyond section 3 of the Act is presaged in the
following dicta:
Media neutrality is reflected in s. 3(1) of the Copyright Act which
describes a right to produce or reproduce a work ‘‘in any material form
whatever.” Media neutrality means that the Copyright Act should
continue to apply in different media, including more technologically
advanced ones.34 (emphasis added)
This broader ambit of the technological neutrality principle as non-
discrimination finds support in both the Rogers35 and Bell36 cases. In Rogers,
33 Robertson v. Thomson Corp., 2006 SCC 43, 2006 CarswellOnt 6182, 2006 CarswellOnt
6183 (S.C.C.).
34 Ibid at para 49.
35 Public Performance of Musical Works, Re, 2012 SCC 35, 2012 CarswellNat 2378, 2012
CarswellNat 2379 (S.C.C.) [Rogers].
36 Public Performance of Musical Works, Re, 2012 SCC 36, 2012 CarswellNat 2380, 2012
CarswellNat 2381 (S.C.C.) [Bell].
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the issue was whether streamed music37 via the internet to individual users
constituted a communication ‘‘to the public” under section 3(1)(f) of the Act. The
appellant online music service providers cited CCH, in which the Court
determined that a fax transmission of a single copy to a single person was not a
communication to the public but that ‘‘a series of repeated fax transmissions of
the same work to numerous different recipients” might be.38 The appellants
interpreted this obiter narrowly to mean that the right is only engaged when there
are multiple transmissions originating from the single act of the sender. Thus any
given stream is point-to-point and cannot be a serial transmission. The
respondent, SOCAN, replied that CCH did not require that a series of
transmissions must result from a single act of a sender to constitute
communication to the public.39
Rothstein J. determined that the appellants’ interpretation of 3(1)(f) would
lead to arbitrary results in that separate emails of a work to 100 recipients would
not constitute infringement but a single email to 100 addressees would.40 The
‘‘true character of the communication activity” and not its technicalities must be
considered to ensure that substance trumps form and copyright protection
develops on a principled basis.41 The true character of streaming is that it is
‘‘targeted at an aggregation of individuals”42 and thus ‘‘to the public” according
to Justice Rothstein. Moreover, to accede to the appellants’ interpretation would
have the effect of excluding all on-demand, or ‘‘pull” technologies from the ambit
of 3(1)(f). Here, Justice Rothstein notes that ‘‘the Act should be interpreted to
extend to technologies that were not or could not have been contemplated at the
time of its drafting.”43 Moreover, he reiterates dicta from Robertson:
Media neutrality means that the Copyright Act should continue to
apply in different media, including more technologically advanced ones
. . .[I]t exists to protect the rights of authors and others as technology
evolves.44
In other words, Rothstein J. applied the technological neutrality principle to
the broadly worded language of section 3(1)(f),45 and as such declared immaterial
37 Unlike downloads which result in permanent copies, a stream ‘‘is a transmission of data
that allows the user to listen to or view the content transmitted at the time of
transmission, resulting only in a temporary copy of the file on the user’s hard drive:”
Rogers, supra note 35 at para 1.
38 CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada, 2004 SCC 13, 2004 CarswellNat
446, 2004 CarswellNat 447 (S.C.C.) at para 78.
39 Rogers, supra note 35 at para 27.
40 Ibid at para 29.
41 Ibid at para 30.
42 Ibid at para 33 (quoting the Copyright Board).
43 Ibid at para 39.
44 Ibid at para 39.
45 Ibid at para 39.
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the differences in the means and method of telecommunication employed so long
as it effected the result of communicating the work ‘‘to the public,” i.e. the work
was ‘‘targeted at an aggregation of individuals”. This, as we will see, was non-
discrimination based on functional equivalency.
Furthermore in Bell, technological neutrality was cited in the court’s fair
dealing analysis. The case concerned whether music preview streams of 30-90
seconds constitute research under fair dealing. In assessing the third factor for
determining the fairness of the dealing—the ‘‘amount” taken—SOCAN argued
that the aggregate number of previews by consumers should be the metric and
given that on average there were 10 previews for each song purchased, the
dealing was unfair.46 The Court disagreed, holding that it is only individual use
that is relevant.47 Moreover, the court emphasized that focusing on aggregate use
on the internet as relevant to fair dealing could undermine the principle of
technological neutrality:48
. . .given the ease and magnitude with which digital works are
disseminated over the Internet, focusing on the “aggregate” amount of
the dealing in cases involving digital works could well lead to
disproportionate findings of unfairness when compared with non-
digital works. If, as SOCAN urges, large-scale organized dealings are
inherently unfair, most of what online service providers do with musical
works would be treated as copyright infringement. This, it seems to me,
potentially undermines the goal of technological neutrality, which seeks
to have the Copyright Act applied in a way that operates consistently,
regardless of the form of media involved, or its technological
sophistication: Robertson v. Thomson Corp., [2006] 2 S.C.R. 363
(S.C.C.), at para. 49.49
This application of technological neutrality to fair dealing implies that the
principle applies to the whole Act including user rights.
In the three cases above, technological neutrality as non-discrimination
ensured that copyright holder, as well as user, rights were appropriately extended
into, as the case may have been, new mediums or methods of reproduction,
dissemination, or research use. As we will see below, comparing extant and new
technologies through the lens of functional equivalency ensured a principled
extension of copyright holder rights. But non-discrimination is not simply
coterminous with functional equivalency, as sometimes the technology in
question has no meaningful real space analogue. Streamed previews of musical
works, as in Bell, presents such a case as one strains to think of a means of music
sampling that is remotely similar. Sometimes then, courts use technological
46 Bell, supra note 36 at para 40.
47 Ibid at para 41.
48 Ibid at para 43.
49 Ibid at para 43.
112 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY [13 C.J.L.T.]
neutrality in a discretionary manner to maintain a balance of rights and interests
under the Act.
(ii) Non-Interference
As a principle of non-interference, technological neutrality seeks to avoid
imposing copyright liability on technologies and activities that, while
theoretically capable of being included under the Act, only incidentally
implicate copyright. Here, courts balance the potential rights of copyright
owners against the interests of technological use and innovation. Moreover,
insofar as such technologies facilitate the dissemination of works, this further
favors a non-infringement holding. There is established precedent in this regard
in Supreme Court copyright jurisprudence, though the older case law does not
explicitly identify technological neutrality by name.
In both the 2004 cases of CCH and SOCAN,50 the court considered the
meaning of ‘‘authorizing” copyright infringement.51 In CCH, the specific issue
was whether self-service photocopier machines located in the Great Library
constituted an implicit ‘‘authorization” on the part of the library for patrons to
commit copyright infringement. The court held that
. . .a person does not authorize infringement by authorizing the mere
use of equipment that could be used to infringe copyright. Courts
should presume that a person who authorizes an activity does so only
so far as it is in accordance with the law. The presumption may be
rebutted if it shown that a certain relationship of control existed
between the alleged authorizer and the persons who committed the
copyright infringement.52
In the context of internet intermediary liability for illegal downloading by
their customers in the SOCAN case, the Court cited the CCH case in finding that
internet service providers do not ‘‘authorize” infringement by merely providing
connectivity:
. . .but it is true, as it was in CCH case, that when massive amounts of
non-copyrighted material are accessible to the end user, it is not
possible to impute to the Internet Service Provider, based solely on the
provision of Internet facilities, an authority to download copyrighted
material as opposed to non-copyrighted material.53
In essence, the holdings in CCH and SOCAN mirror the staple article of
commerce doctrine in U.S. copyright law, meaning that the mere sale or
50 Society of Composers, Authors & Music Publishers of Canada v. Canadian Assn. of
Internet Providers, 2004 SCC 45, 2004 CarswellNat 1919, 2004 CarswellNat 1920
(S.C.C.).
51 Section 3 of theAct provides, as a distinct right at the end of s 3, ‘‘. . .and to authorize any
such acts”, also known as the authorization right.
52 CCH, supra note 38 at para 38.
53 SOCAN, supra note 50 at para 123.
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provision of products or services that have substantial non-infringing uses will
not, without more, invite copyright infringement.54
Furthermore, the court in SOCAN considered whether the practice of
caching copies on servers came within section 2.4 which insulates from liability
those who merely provide the means of telecommunication ‘‘necessary for
another person to so communicate the work. . .” In reading down the language of
‘‘necessary” to mean that which maximizes the cost-effectiveness and efficiency
of the internet (as opposed to its more ordinary meaning as ‘‘indispensable”), the
court was explicitly concerned about regulatory chill.55 The court reasoned that
the practice of caching was an innovation that helped promote the dissemination
of works (one of the goals of copyright law) without interfering with the
legitimate entitlements of copyright owners.56 Incidental copies, in other words,
were determined to lie outside the reproduction right as the interests of
technological economy and efficiency trumped the making of mere technical
copies that were imperceptible to an end user.
In Public Performance of Musical Works, Re,57 the issue was whether an
additional telecommunication right tariff should apply to internet download
purchases of video games for which a reproduction right fee had already been
paid. The majority opinion reversed prior interpretations of section 3(1)(f) by
indicating that the provision’s pedigree was as a performance right and thus was
not triggered by the downloading (or reproduction) of copies. The majority also
affirmed that it would violate the principle of technological neutrality to treat a
hard copy purchased in a store differently than a copy obtained via internet
download:58
The principle of technological neutrality requires that, absent evidence
of Parliamentary intent to the contrary, we interpret the Copyright Act
in a way that avoids imposing an additional layer of protections and
fees based solely on the method of delivery of the work to the end user.
To do otherwise would effectively impose a gratuitous cost for the use
of more efficient, Internet-based technologies.59
54 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (U.S. Sup. Ct., 1984)
considered whether the sale of video cassette recorders, which had infringing and
noninfringing uses, constituted contributory infringement under U.S. copyright law. At
442: ‘‘The staple article of commerce doctrine must strike a balance between a copyright
holder’s legitimate demand for effective—not merely symbolic—protection of the
statutory monopoly, and the rights of others freely to engage in substantially unrelated
areas of commerce. Accordingly, the sale of copying equipment, like the sale of other
articles of commerce, does not constitute contributory infringement if the product is
widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes. Indeed, it need merely be capable
of substantial noninfringing uses.”
55 SOCAN, supra note 50 at para 114.
56 Ibid at para 115.
57 Public Performance of Musical Works, Re, 2012 SCC 34, 2012 CarswellNat 2376, 2012
CarswellNat 2377 (S.C.C.) [Entertainment Software].
58 Ibid at para 5.
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Again, an activity judged exogenous to copyright—the downloading of a
work as a method of electronic commerce—was insulated from potential
liability.
This string of cases, whether in name or in conceptual application, invoke a
principle of technological neutrality as non-interference by: (1) ensuring
appropriately high thresholds of active conduct (i.e. control and knowledge)
are in place before the use of technology will be hampered by concerns for
copyright infringement; (2) declaring that incidental non-usable copies made in
the process of facilitating the efficient and economical transmission of internet
communications will not trigger copyright infringement; and (3) overturning a
previous interpretation of the section 3(1)(f) right so that e-commerce delivery of
products do not attract copyright infringement. In each instance, it is fair to say
that the court could just as easily (indeed perhaps more easily) have made the
opposite interpretation, given previous court holdings and the statutory language
in question. Instead, a principle of technological neutrality justified, and
rationalized, the law in a way that balanced the legitimate rights of copyright
holders against the legitimate uses and innovations of technological
development. Functional equivalency provided a lens through which to
understand the activity in question in Entertainment Software. But as CCH
and SOCAN show, technological neutrality as non-interference is much more
than analogizing different technologies in light of the law. Rather, its
preoccupation is to ensure that copyright liability does not attach to new
innovations, unless the activity in question truly impacts on the legitimate rights
of copyright holders.
(iii) The Corollary of Functional Equivalency
In the present context, functional equivalency is the process of analogizing
between two technologies relative to a specific legal question that identifies a
function. Specifically, we look to the law to see what specific legal issue and
function is identified as relevant (e.g. what is a ‘‘reproduction” or
communication ‘‘to the public”?) and then analogize between a known
technology (that falls within the rule) and a new one (that we are not sure
about) to see if they perform the same function, notwithstanding their obvious
differences. The function as identified in the law, and comparison between
technological facts, is usually viewed through the lens of an end user of the
technology.
In Robertson, for example, the legal question was whose originality was
reproduced through digitized copies—that of the newspaper (collective work) or
the journalist (individual article). Much like other case law dealing with internet
and digital technologies, the court had to choose a perspective about what it
means to reproduce a work. According to a technical perspective (argued as the
‘‘input” perspective), if the collective work is entered in a digitized form as such
59 Ibid at para 9.
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then it remains a collective work regardless of it screen display format to the end
user. The ‘‘output” perspective, on the other hand, asks whether what is
displayed on the screen reproduces the originality of the newsprint collective
work, or the stand alone article. The court favored the latter perspective.
Sometimes then, the legal issue itself needs to be defined more precisely—whether
technical or display copies constitute reproduction—before a functional analysis
between the technologies—newsprint paper versus CD ROM version of an
archived daily—can be undertaken. Often, the perspective adopted is that of the
end user of the technology.
Functional equivalency is a useful heuristic for developing the law in a
principled way through analogical reasoning. However, it is not the only measure
of when a principle of technological neutrality should apply. The CCH and
SOCAN cases, in particular, are fine examples of how courts choose not to
impede technological innovation through copyright liability in the absence of a
functional equivalency argument.
III. CBC V. SODRAC AT THE SUPREME COURT
The Supreme Court’s digital and internet copyright jurisprudence reveals
different manifestations of a principle of technological neutrality. The principle
has two main facets, non-discrimination and non-interference, both of which now
appear well established in the law. The methodology for determining when the
principle applies is, like the application of all principles of law, a matter of
judgment in specific cases. In some cases, a heuristic of functional equivalency
has been adopted. As the name implies, this demands that a function first be
identified; that function is framed by the specific legal issue usually as perceived
from the perspective of an end user of the technology. An analogy is then drawn
between the two technologies specific to that function to determine equivalency.
What does all of this mean for CBC v. SODRAC? It depends on the type of
copies at issue. With respect to purely incidental copies, i.e. those rendered non-
usable or are dormant as sound recordings after production and broadcast, there
is a persuasive argument from a standpoint of coherence that these should not be
subject to separate charge as reproductions. From the digitized input argument
in Robertson, to the cached copies in SOCAN, to the temporary file copies
created to effect streaming in Rogers, the Supreme Court has consistently denied
the possibility of incidental technical copies as implicating the reproduction right.
The reason for this is that the court has viewed the ultimate functional purpose of
the activity in question—be it providing a means of telecommunication, or
reproducing or performing a work—to be material, not the technical means by
which that function is accomplished. Implicit in this reasoning is the idea that
such copies are temporary and not ultimately usable after serving their purpose.
Moreover, this result accords with the rationale of technological neutrality as
non-interference. In the balancing act between the interests of technological use
and innovation on the one hand and the legitimate interests of copyright holders
on the other hand, there appears little contest. These unusable or dormant copies
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serve only to facilitate efficient and economical digital communications (as well
as dissemination of works) while the claim to reproduction for copies that are not
part of the end product is correspondingly weak.
The legal status of usable copies which survive the production and broadcast
process and serve an identifiable purpose as reproductions seems less clear.
Indeed, even the new amendments to the Act do not provide a clear answer.60
This is where individual judgment about the weight of the principle of
technological neutrality relative to the weight of the legitimate rights of a
copyright owner may be balanced. The most sensible view is to treat these copies
as reproductions but to accord them value relative to their purpose. In other
words, archived copies would implicate the reproduction right but only in terms
of its value as an archived copy. It would be wrong to assess these copies, as the
Board did, at a premium rate on the basis that copyright owners should share the
benefits of copy-dependent technology used by broadcasters. In fact, this
reasoning tilts the balance too heavily in favor of copyright holders as the
substantial increased cost would hamper the use and innovation of these new
production methods, thus violating the principle of technological neutrality as
non-interference.
IV. CONCLUSION
In their own unique ways, the Copyright Board and Federal Court of Appeal
decisions profoundly misunderstood the principle of technological neutrality that
has emerged over the past dozen years within the skein of Supreme Court of
Canada copyright jurisprudence. The Copyright Board’s perception that the
benefits accruing from technology are an added value in which copyright holders
are entitled to share (regardless of the kind of copying that takes place) is
fundamentally at odds with Supreme Court holdings, in similar cases, that
copyright should not place an undue cost to the development of new
technologies. The principle of technological neutrality requires a more nuanced
understanding of when reproduction rights are triggered within a performance
rights context so as to balance the rights of copyright holders against the rights of
technology users and innovators. The Federal Court of Appeal’s folly is less
transparent though equally flawed. Relying on the precedent of Bishop v.
Stephens, the court believed it was on solid ground in finding that ephemeral
copies trigger the reproduction right. However, a number of Supreme Court
cases have since rendered this precedent incoherent. Incidental copying has long
been ubiquitous in the digital and internet context, and the Supreme Court has
routinely refuted any reproduction rights associated with them.
This article has offered a conception of technological neutrality, both as an
analytical tool for understanding the copyright implications of new technologies,
60 Section 30.71 and 30.8 both contemplate that incidental copies (which are permitted to
effect technological processes or a broadcast) must in the normal course of events be
destroyed after their purpose has been served.
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and as a mediating principle of copyright law. The analytical framework suggests
that technological neutrality as non-discrimination extends the rights of copyright
owners and users in a way that ensures that these rights remain relevant to the
emergence of practices associated with new technologies. Technological
neutrality as non-interference, on the other hand, acts on a check against
copyright liability attaching too readily to activities that either do not
legitimately impact on the rights of copyright holders, or when they do, reach
too far beyond copyright to be reasonable. In this way, technological uses and
innovations are not unduly curtailed. Importantly, technological neutrality in
either manifestation operates as a principle of law. It is a question of judgement
if, and how, it applies. Still it can have decisive force in determining the outcome
of a given case, either as a means of elucidating the content of vague statutory
language or as offering a reason to avoid an otherwise absurd rendering of the
law.
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